



SAPIENZA
UNIVERSITÀ DI ROMA

ISSN 2385-2755
DiSSE Working papers
[online]

WORKING PAPERS SERIES
DIPARTIMENTO DI
SCIENZE SOCIALI ED ECONOMICHE

**Rethinking the nexus between
populism and conspiracy theories: a
theoretical framework**

Claudia Annovi



N. 5/2024

SAPIENZA - UNIVERSITY OF ROME

P.le Aldo Moro n.5 – 00185 Roma T(+39) 0649910563

CF80209930587 – P.IVA 02133771002

Rethinking the nexus between populism and conspiracy theories: a theoretical framework

Claudia Annovi

Abstract

The aim of this working paper is hence to retrace the academic international debate over conspiracist populism to create an original theoretical framework. The resulting structure and considerations will allow to formulate hypotheses that will guide the qualitative research afterwards and will help investigate further the chosen case study. Therefore, the paper is composed of two main parts. The first section delves into the academic debate on the nexus between populism and conspiracy theories. More specifically, this part considers the theoretical literature produced so far regarding conspiracist populism. The second section is the in-depth analysis of the functioning of conspiracist populism.

Claudia Annovi, claudia.annovi@uniroma1.it, Doctoral School in Social and Sciences and Economics, Sapienza

Introduction

Over the last decade, conspiracy theories (CT) have turned into a daily expression and obtained growing attention. As in every period of crisis, the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic and the subsequent psychological and socio-economic distress it has created contributed to the growth of new conspiracy theories offering simple solutions to complex issues (Douglas, 2021). In some cases, CT have been also instrumentalized by populist leaders to incite violent insurrections: the January 6 attack to Capitol Hill, for instance, was the result of the call to action of the former U.S. President Donald Trump, falsely claiming an electoral fraud in 2020 presidential elections. Interestingly enough, conspiracy theories seem to have become recurring features and frames also in mainstream politics, especially among populist parties.

Conspiracy theories and populism seem to share a number of core features whose connection is still underexplored. Most notably, the main common denominator to these two concepts is the dichotomic paradigm through which they understand society and politics and that is fundamentally based on the core opposition between an in-group – the people or the virtuous community – and an out-group – namely, the corrupted élite or, broadly speaking, the Other (Bergmann, 2018). Moreover, the

totalizing and immersive dimension of conspiracy thinking, leading people to see secret plots everywhere and distrust anyone, closely resembles the way populists engage supporters by creating a sense of urgent and impending threat to people (Moffitt, 2015; Urbinati 2022).

The increasing exploitation of conspiracy beliefs by populists in power sheds light on the mutual strength they might draw from each other. On the one hand, promoting conspiracy thinking seems reinforcing the populist power struggle, while on the other, the institutionalization of conspiracy theories of any kind might facilitate their spread in society and politics and transform them into legitimate tools in the political arena. Against this backdrop, what role do conspiracy theories play in presidential populism? How can they represent both valid communicative tools and political tactics to conspiracist populism?

The aim of this working paper is hence to retrace the academic international debate over conspiracist populism to create an original theoretical framework. The resulting structure and considerations will allow to formulate hypotheses that will guide the qualitative research afterwards and will help investigate further the chosen case study. Therefore, the paper is composed of two main parts. The first section delves into the academic debate on the nexus between populism and conspiracy theories. More specifically, this part considers the theoretical literature produced so far regarding conspiracist populism. The second section is the in-depth analysis of the functioning of conspiracist populism.

Deconstructing conspiracist populism

The concepts of conspiracy theories and populism have produced a significant amount of literature over the last decades. However, although conspiracy theories are increasingly moving out from extremist politics to enter the institutional political arena, the research on how CTs can be politicized and institutionalized by populists is still at its beginnings (Bergmann 2018; Bergmann & Butter, 2020; Pirro & Taggart 2023).

Analyzing these two concepts comparatively allow to highlight some specific characteristics thereof that might elude an approach based on a single perspective. On the one hand, considering conspiracy theories as potential communication tools and logic itself of populists in power sheds light on the protean nature of contemporary populism itself (Manucci, 2022), a phenomenon that changes according to the time and context in which it evolves. On the other, this cross analysis emphasizes that conspiracy theories are not simple morality tales “that produce vicious circles of internally consistent explanations and analogies” (Farinelli, 2021, p.5). On the contrary, when entering the political arena, they can turn into hegemonic and systemic political worldviews (Giry and Tika, 2020)

serving the communication as well as the mode of governance of populists. Against this backdrop, a deconstruction and analysis of conspiracist populism is deemed necessary.

Literature on populism has flourished over the last three decades given the increasing importance of populist politics in various geographical areas (see Moffitt, 2016). At the same time, despite the vast amount of work that have been produced, populism-related research still suffers from the absence of a shared definition of the phenomenon, and the diverse approaches that have been elaborated so far can make the investigation more complex (Anselmi, 2017). Therefore, before delving into the discussion on the nature of populism, a brief overview of which approach is useful – and will be used – in this case is appropriate.

Broadly speaking, two different approaches have been extensively used to investigate the phenomenon: the discursive approach, thinking at populism as a discursive device and a political style to overcome the subalternity of the people to the political élite (Laclau, 2005; Moffitt & Tormey, 2014); and the ideational approach, framing populism as a thin-centered ideology revolving around the antagonism between the people and the corrupted élite and the general will as the expression of people's general will (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). Despite some similarities and the strong methodological benefits that both have, these different approaches are flawed insofar they investigate the phenomenon partially. On the one hand, the discursive approach tends to reduce populism to the dimension of communication, hence dismissing the potential social dynamics and political ideologies behind it. On the other, the ideational approach risks being an analytical chimera, since in many cases, populist agendas are not defined by ideologies as much as by style.

In this framework, the conceptualization provided by Jagers and Walgrave (2007) seems to bridge the gaps between the ideational and the discursive approach and, most importantly, provide useful methodological guidelines for investigating the phenomenon. Tellingly, the two scholars, while tapping into the traditional and recurring three elements of populism (the people, the anti-establishment stances and the anti-élite feelings), establish a distinction between “thin” and “thick” populism. Thin populism is defined as a “political communication style of political actors that refers to the people” (p. 322). Consequently, it consists of a communicative master frame that is employed specifically by populist actors (but not only) to appeal to the people and that, methodologically, can be used as an operational tool to analyse the political discourses and search for thick forms of populism. In this light, then, thick populism is conceived as the result of a communicative reference to the people combined with a political opposition, both discursively and strategically, to the élite and the establishment (p. 323). This all-encompassing conceptualization seems to merge the insights from

the discursive and the ideational approaches, and proves useful to operationalize populism. Against this backdrop, it is possible to investigate properly the concept of conspiracist populism.

The populist tendency to distinguish neatly between the innocent and pure people and a malignant powerful élite evokes the dichotomic conspiracist distinction among unknowing people and conspirators in power plotting against them (Bergmann, 2018). Such a Manichean worldview represents one of the main identifying feature of both phenomena, and influences their attitudes over a number of issues – first of all, politics. The inherent distrust towards the élite, on the one hand, and the glorification of popular sovereignty (for populism) or common people reasoning (for conspiracy theories), on the other, make both phenomena primarily majoritarian – hence opposing the idea that the majority of the people should be entitled to a certain degree of primacy in decision-making without interferences (Pirro & Taggart, 2023). In addition to this, conspiracy theories and populism seem to rely also on a sense of urgency that is expressed in slightly different ways: while conspiracy theories – especially referring to politics – are grounded on a sense of paranoia and urgency (Hofstadter, 1969), populism rests on a performance of crisis (Moffitt, 2015) that enables it to grow, attract new supporters and, ultimately, have success.

Besides these recurring observations highlighting the terms of convergence between populism and conspiracy theories, another common issue requires further attention – namely, an underlying anti-pluralism (Muirhead & Rosenblum, 2019). Indeed, conspiracy theories see politics in a non-pluralistic way, resting on the assumption that powerful conspiring élites and powerless people are uniform entities (Pirro & Taggart, 2023). In the same way, “populists distinguish themselves because they rely on a moral notion of a homogenous and pure people that is united by a single common identity and interest, and it is them – the populist politicians – who represent, articulate or even embody, this single united interest” (Crum, 2019, p.2). The common claim of a moral monopoly of representing the people and the inherent and immovable opposition to power bloc shed hence lights on the strength they can draw from one another. Indeed, while conspiracy theories can represent potential performative and communicative methods to gain momentum, secure consensus and perpetrate a sense of crisis within society, populism can serve as the political benchmark for conspiracist actors to put forwards their claims and a gateway to enter the political arena.

Far from being simple discursive devices, then, conspiracy theories can both play the role of the logic of populism (Fieschi, 2019; p. 160) and the trope thereof (Taggart, 2018), hence strengthening the rhetoric as well as the ideological groundwork of populist actors. In other words, conspiracy theories are force multipliers for populist politics, and conspiracist populism can be defined as an alternative to politics – or “unpolitics” (Taggart, 2018) – reinforced, ideologically and rhetorically, by the

recurring or systematic use of conspiracy theories. This reconceptualization can potentially help distinguish between thin forms of conspiracist populism – hence sometimes referring to the people through occasional conspiracist frames – and thick forms of populism – namely, incorporating conspiracy theories to support anti-pluralism and anti-establishment feelings.

The functioning of conspiracist populism: an overview

Against this backdrop, an overview of the fundamental features of conspiracist populism and their functioning is deemed necessary. A meaningful work that successfully broke down the architecture of conspiracist populism has been produced by Pirro and Taggart (2023). Indeed, the two authors identified the three core elements composing populist conspiracy theories – the “who” (the targeted groups), the “when” (the set of conditions), and the “why” (the functional utility) – and highlighted how conspiracist populists maintain their anti-pluralistic and anti-establishment stance in different situations. In addition, the literature on this topic (Moffitt, 2015; Bergmann & Butter, 2020; Müller, 2022) suggests that it is possible to identify a fourth core element – namely, the “how” (means and methods) through which they can do this.

The first issue requiring attention is the set of external conditions that leads populist actors to adopt different types of conspiracy theories. Broadly speaking, we can identify three political moments driving populists to support and adopt CT: when they are part of the democratic game and they are, for instance, conducting an electoral campaign as opposition groups; when they lose elections of any kind; and when they are in power. Despite political advantages of CT are explored later in this section, some reflections regarding how they develop different types of narrative according to the phase they are necessary. Therefore, whenever in opposition, populist actors need to present themselves as the “outsider” candidates that are morally outside and above politics and are willing to change it radically (Taggart, 2018). Consequently, in this contexts populists tend to resort to conspiracy theories to mobilize support, demonize their opponents (frequently casting moral and ethical doubts on them), and to fashion themselves as the anti-establishment actors that will put forward “people’s real needs” (Bergmann & Butter, 2020). The type of conspiracy narratives they employ are different when they do not well at the polls – hence facing a fundamental contradiction. Indeed, populist actors must explain why the (allegedly) only legitimate representatives of the people failed at elections. In this case, as pointed out by Müller (2022, p. 614), populists might suggest that the majority of the people was consciously silenced, hence claiming that the corrupted élites manipulated the electoral process. A clear example of this mechanism is the claim of Donald Trump of an electoral fraud after his failure at 2020 elections. On the contrary, a different scenario emerges if populists are in power. In this context, conspiracy theories can represent fundamental tool to divert the attention from their newly-

acquired establishment status and/or from their political failures in order to regain support (Pirro & Taggart, 2023).

The second core element of conspiracist populism is the targeted groups populist CT usually address. Going beyond simple explanations of the power bloc conspiring against citizens, Pirro and Taggart (2023, p.4-5) explained meaningfully the architecture of “enemies” of conspiracist populists, hence identifying two outgroups: the internal outgroup and the external outgroup. The internal outgroup, simply put, corresponds to those individuals or groups that are sociologically and culturally proximate (e.g. part of the same country) and pose a direct domestic threat to populist actors and the people at large. Among these, they mention mainstream and non-aligned media, political opponents, opposition parties and, of course, the national powerful élite. Conversely, the external outgroup is perceived as more distant and usually includes foreign countries, international or supranational organizations, and immigrants.

The functional utility of conspiracy theories for populists varies according to the political position they find themselves in and the challenges they are facing. In this sense, CT can serve various purposes. Two levels of functionality can be identified: gain or maintain the support among the people and perpetrate their power. Consequently, conspiracy theories can serve to attack their opponents in different circumstances to vilify them and undermine their credibility; present themselves as, alternatively, the heroes against or the victim of the power élite; depict the public enemy against which a political identity can be created; support and back their political manoeuvres or justify their failures; and, most importantly, foster a sense of permanent state of alert (Pirro & Taggart, 2023; Müller, 2022).

Creating, performing and perpetrating a sense of crisis is the core element of how populist conspiracism works and it exemplifies the discursive and strategic capacity of CT for populists. As Moffitt (2015) pointed out, the existence of populism is strictly linked to a sense of real or perceived crisis, as populist actors constantly perform crisis in order to gain momentum. The six-steps model of populist performance of crisis elaborated by Moffitt can be hence useful to explain how conspiracist populism works.

The first step of this process is identifying a failure – especially if it has some political salience – and bringing attention on that as a matter of urgency (Moffitt, 2015; p. 198). The next phase is to wisely link the chosen failure to others and locating it within a wider and structural framework, hence elevating the level of crisis. By recurring to a dramatized and simplified rhetoric, populists elevate this issue to a matter of national danger, where the temporal dimension is fundamental – therefore, stressing the need to take action immediately (p.200). The third step consists of identifying those

responsible for the crisis and demonize them as the enemy of the unknowing people who is suffering because of their actions and decisions. This very phase is crucial for conspiracist populism in two ways: on the one hand, it fosters the creation of a group identity against an enemy, as populist identity is more constructed against something than on something (Taggart, 2000); on the other, it is fundamental to “objectively” target their opponents, hence going beyond partisan feelings or prejudices (Moffitt, 2015; p.202). The subsequent step consists of an use of media (and social media) to propagate the crisis. Here a distinction from Moffitt’s model should be made: while the author focuses almost exclusively on traditional media, in the contemporary political arena – and when speaking of populist conspiracism – the attention should be brought first and foremost on social media. Indeed, they not only contribute to create a context of infodemic (Annovi, 2021a) to exacerbate the crisis, but they also help replace scientific validation of an information with social repetition (Muirhead & Rosenblum, 2019). As a consequence, news does not acquire recognition because experts verified it, but because it has been spread by a lot of people. After a failure has been spectacularized and the sense of crisis has been spread, the next phase for populist actors is to present themselves as the heroes with the right solution. Three main performative methods are identified in this case by Moffitt (2015; p. 204); insisting on the incompetence of the political status quo; offering simple and straightforward remedies to the crisis; and finally, advocating for a radical change of the institutional functioning and the democratic process. In this framework, the Taggart’s concept of “unpolitics” (2018) to describe populist *modus operandi* and approach is relevant. As pointed out by the author, the distinctive trait of populism is the reject of the idea of politics as the rightful process to resolve conflicts. For this reason, they frequently present themselves as reluctantly political and “will often claim to be in politics as a temporary measure to fix a crisis” (Taggart, 2018; p. 81). This perspective reinforces the suggestions made by Moffitt: the façade of the outsider that engaged in politics only in the name of the people strengthens populists’ credibility, but, at the same time, their need for simple explanations is indicative of their “unpolitical” strategy. The ultimate step of populist performance of crisis is hence the continuation of the propagation of crisis (Moffitt, 2015; p. 205). Since the survival of populism is strictly related to its capacity to persist in performing a sense of abiding urgency, these actors have to work in this direction and fight the loss of political salience or interest in the failures they have thrived on. One of the way they can attempt to do so is to shift their attention to another topic of public interest or concern – hence, for instance, replacing the issue of the corrupted political élite in power with the issue of the migration crisis. Another tactic is to exaggerate the extent and size of the crisis and include other new actors in the frame of enmity – such as foreign enemies or international institutions.

Conclusions

The present working paper aimed at providing a literature review and critical analysis of the nexus between populism and conspiracy theories as well as the resulting form of conspiracist populism. The goal was to provide a proper theoretical background to support future research, and provide some methodological guidelines to carry it out.

Two conclusions can be reached from the above analysis. On the one hand, the discursive and the ideological approaches, widely used within literature investigating populism, appear to be flawed in the specific study of the nexus between this phenomenon and conspiracy theories. On the contrary, the distinction between “thin” and “thick” forms of populism put forward by Jagers and Walgrave can bridge the gaps and offer new analytical tools to fully understand this intersection. On the other hand, considering the process of performance of crisis of conspiracist populism can shed light on the fundamental utility conspiracy theories can play for populists, especially those in power.

Bibliography

Annovi, Claudia. «Il fenomeno QAnon e le sfide per l'Amministrazione Biden» *Ce.S.I. Centro Studi Internazionali*. 2021a. Consultato 20 settembre 2023. <https://www.cesi-italia.org/it/articoli/il-fenomeno-qanon-e-le-sfide-per-lamministrazione-biden>.

Anselmi, Manuel. *Populismo. Teorie e problemi*. Mondadori università, 2017.

Baden, C., & Sharon, T. (2021). “Blinded by the lies? Toward an integrated definition of conspiracy theories”. *Communication Theory*, 31(1), 82-106.

Balta, Evren, Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, e Alper H Yagci. “Populist Attitudes and Conspiratorial Thinking”. *Party Politics* 28, fasc. 4 (luglio 2022): 625–37. <https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688211003304>.

Barkun, Michael. "The nature of conspiracy belief." *A Culture of Conspiracy. Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America Berkeley: University of California Press* 2 (2003): 1-14.

Barkun, Michael. *A culture of conspiracy: Apocalyptic visions in contemporary America*. Vol. 15. Univ of California Press, 2013.

Bartlett, Jamie, and Carl Miller. *The power of unreason: Conspiracy theories, extremism and counter-terrorism*. London: Demos, 2010.

Bergmann, E., & Butter, M. (2020). “Conspiracy theory and populism”. In Butter, Michael, e Peter Knight. *Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories*, s.d.

Bergmann, Eirikur. *Conspiracy & populism: The politics of misinformation*. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018.

Bilewicz, Michał, and Anna Stefaniak. "Can a victim be responsible? Antisemitic consequences of victimhood-based identity and competitive victimhood in Poland." *Responsibility: An interdisciplinary perspective* (2013): 69-77.

- Blokker, Paul. "Populism as a constitutional project." *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 17.2 (2019): 536-553.
- Bronner, Gérald. "Pourquoi les théories du complot se portent-elles si bien? L'exemple de Charlie Hebdo." *Diogène* 1 (2015): 9-20.
- Castanho Silva, Bruno, Federico Vegetti, e Levente Littvay. "The Elite Is Up to Something: Exploring the Relation Between Populism and Belief in Conspiracy Theories", *Swiss Political Science Review* 23, fasc. 4 (dicembre 2017): 423–43. <https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12270>.
- Crum, Ben. "Living with anti-pluralist populism in Europe: Insights from the Dutch 2017 elections." *Europeanisation versus Renationalisation: Learning from crisis for European political development* (2019): 37-48.
- Dean, Jodi. *Aliens in America: Conspiracy cultures from outerspace to cyberspace*. Cornell University Press, 1998.
- Douglas, Karen M. "COVID-19 Conspiracy Theories". *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 24, fasc. 2 (1 febbraio 2021): 270–75. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430220982068>.
- Farinelli, Francesco. "Conspiracy theories and right-wing extremism – Insights and recommendations for P/CVE", *RAN*, 2021.
- Fenster, Mark. *Conspiracy theories: Secrecy and power in American culture*. U of Minnesota Press, 1999.
- Fieschi, Catherine. *Populocracy: The tyranny of authenticity and the rise of populism*. Agenda Publishing, 2019.
- Giry, Julien, and Pranvera Tika. "Conspiracy theories in political science and political theory." (2020). In Butter, Michael, e Peter Knight. *Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories*, s.d.
- Giry, Julien. "A specific social function of rumours and conspiracy theories: strengthening community's ties in trouble times – a multilevel analysis", in *Slovak Ethnology* (65:2) 187-202.
- Goertzel, Ted. "Belief in conspiracy theories." *Political psychology* (1994): 731-742.
- Gould, Andrew C. "Conflicting imperatives and concept formation." *The Review of Politics* 61.3 (1999): 439-464.
- Hameleers, Michael. "They Are Selling Themselves Out to the Enemy! The Content and Effects of Populist Conspiracy Theories". *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 33, fasc. 1 (6 aprile 2021): 38–56. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edaa004>.
- Harambam, Jaron. «Conspiracy theory entrepreneurs, movements and individuals. ». In Butter, Michael, e Peter Knight. *Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories*, s.d.
- Ho, Park Jung, e Chun Sang Jin. "La théorie du complot comme un simulacre de sciences sociales ?": *Sociétés* n°112, fasc. 2 (15 luglio 2011): 147–61. <https://doi.org/10.3917/soc.112.0147>.
- Hofstadter, Richard. *The paranoid style in American politics*. Vintage, 2012.
- Ionescu, Ghița, and Ernest Gellner. "Populism: its meaning and national characteristics." (*No Title*) (1969).

Jagers, Jan, and Stefaan Walgrave. "Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of political parties' discourse in Belgium." *European journal of political research* 46.3 (2007): 319-345.

Laclau, Ernesto. *On populist reason*. Verso, 2005.

Manne, Kate. The Logic of Misogyny. *Boston Review*, July 16.

Manucci, Luca, ed. *The Populism Interviews: A Dialogue with Leading Experts*. Taylor & Francis, 2022.

Moffitt, Benjamin, and Simon Tormey. "Rethinking populism: Politics, mediatisation and political style." *Political studies* 62.2 (2014): 381-397.

Moffitt, Benjamin. "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism". *Government and Opposition* 50, fasc. 2 (2015): 189–217.

Moffitt, Benjamin. *The global rise of populism: Performance, political style, and representation*. Stanford University Press, 2016.

Moore, Alfred. "Conspiracies, Conspiracy Theories and Democracy". *Political Studies Review* 16, fasc. 1 (febbraio 2018): 2–12. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1478-9302.12102>.

Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. *Populism: A very short introduction*. Oxford University Press, 2017.

Müller, Jan-Werner. "What, if anything, do populism and conspiracy theories have to do with each other?." *Social Research: An International Quarterly* 89.3 (2022): 607-625.

Müller, Jan-Werner. *What is populism?*. Penguin UK, 2017.

Nefes, Türkey Salim, and Alejandro Romero-Reche. "Sociology, social theory and conspiracy theory." Butter, Michael, e Peter Knight. *Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories*, s.d.

Pirro, Andrea Lp, e Paul Taggart. "Populists in Power and Conspiracy Theories". *Party Politics* 29, fasc. 3 (maggio 2023): 413–23. <https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688221077071>.

Radeck, Mats. "Tunisia's Deadlocked Situation: President Saied Takes the Authoritarian Exit". *Beyond the horizon*, 13 maggio, 2022. <https://behorizon.org/tunisias-deadlocked-situation-president-saied-takes-the-authoritarian-exit/>

Renard, Jean-Bruno. "Les causes de l'adhésion aux théories du complot." *Diogène* 1 (2015): 107-119.

Rosenblum, Nancy L., and Russell Muirhead. *A lot of people are saying: The new conspiracism and the assault on democracy*. Princeton University Press, 2019.

Serwer, Adam. «Birtherism of a Nation». *The Atlantic* (blog), 14 maggio 2020. <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/birtherism-and-trump/610978/>.

Taggart, Paul. *Populism and 'unpolitics'*. 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN: Routledge, 2018.

Urbinati, Nadia. «Conspiracy: Systemic and Pragmatic». *Social Research: An International Quarterly* 89, fasc. 3 (settembre 2022): 707–30. <https://doi.org/10.1353/sor.2022.0040>.

Urbinati, Nadia. *Democracy disfigured: opinion, truth, and the people*. Harvard University Press, 2014.

Uscinski, Joseph E., and Joseph M. Parent. *American conspiracy theories*. Oxford University Press, 2014.

Wagner-Egger, Pascal, Sylvain Delouvée, Nicolas Gauvrit, e Sebastian Dieguez. «Creationism and Conspiracism Share a Common Teleological Bias». *Current Biology* 28, fasc. 16 (agosto 2018): R867–68. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2018.06.072>.

Wood, M. J., Douglas, K. M., & Sutton, R. M. (2012). Dead and alive: Beliefs in contradictory conspiracy theories. *Social psychological and personality science*, 3(6), 767-773.

Woods, Dwayne. «The Many Faces of Populism: Diverse but not Disparate». In *The Many Faces of Populism: Current Perspectives*, 22:1–25. Research in Political Sociology. Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2014. <https://doi.org/10.1108/S0895-993520140000022001>.